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Criminologists and terrorism specialists alike have conducted research on the deterrent 
effect of policies; however, to date, only criminologists have thoroughly examined the 
associated displacement of crime and diffusion of benefits.  Using data from the Eco-
Incidents Database, this study first examines the deterrent effect of government efforts 
targeting animal rights and environmental terrorism over several years.  Next, it extends 
this application by examining non-terrorist actions by both terrorist groups and non-
terrorist groups to see if deterrent actions have any unintended consequences.  Results 
show no evidence of displacement, but rather that several government actions evidenced 
a diffusion of benefits.  If anti-terrorist laws reduce other types of crime, particularly by 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Deterrence efforts and their subsequent externalities, displacement and diffusion 
of crime-control benefits, are a common theme of discourse in criminological literature 
(see, for example, Weisburd et al. 2006; Clark and Weisburd 1994; Johnson, Guerette, 
and Bowers 2012; Weisburd et al. 2011; Braga and Weisburd 2014).  However, the same 
terminology is sparsely applied to studies of terrorism (for exceptions, see Hsu and Apel 
2015; Clarke and Newman 2006).  This fact stands in contrast to years of terrorism 
literature emphasizing that terrorists are rational actors and react to typical deterrent 
tactics such as target hardening (Brandt and Sandler 2010; Wang and Bier 2011), forceful 
crackdowns or operations (LaFree, Dugan, and Korte 2009), and conciliatory measures 
(Dugan and Chenoweth 2012).  However, as many authors have noticed, deterrence is not 
a certain result of these actions.  Typically, the impact is more complicated and may 
cause the terrorists to change tactics or targets (Enders and Sandler 1993) or increase 
their efforts in retaliation (LaFree, Dugan, and Korte 2009).  Furthermore, many studies 
ignore the possibility that benefits diffuse to groups outside their scope.  Adopting this 
criminological nomenclature into terrorism research will add depth to the current 
understanding of ramifications from counterterrorism policy decisions. 
An apt application of deterrence, displacement, and diffusion of benefits is toward 
the study of animal-rights and environmental terrorism in the United States.  It is 
important to provide a brief history and context of the movement in order to justify why 
this case study fits the proscribed criminological framework. 
In 1992, Congress passed the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) in 




environmental terrorist groups, particularly the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).  ALF 
originated in Great Britain in the 1960s and 1970s with goals of inflicting economic 
damage on organizations profiting from harming animals, revealing the nature of animal 
abuse inflicted by organizations, and freeing animals from such organizations (Liddick 
2006).  As the 1970s progressed, ALF began to influence similar operations in the United 
States.  While the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) believes domestic animal-rights 
terrorism began in the early 1970s, the first ALF attack in the United States occurred in 
1977 (Best and Nocella 2004).  The largest environmental terrorist group, the Earth 
Liberation Front (ELF), was a nascent group in Great Britain in 1992, but its influences 
were already spreading to Canada and the United States.  The first ELF attack in Canada 
took place on June 19, 1995 when members damaged a lodge and burnt down a wildlife 
museum (Best and Nocella 2004).  The first ELF terrorist attack in the United States 
occurred on December 25, 1996 when ELF members stormed a fur farm, destroyed 
property, and released a number of minks in Michigan (Best and Nocella 2004)  
While the animal rights and environmental terrorist movement was rising to 
prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, a distinct community of non-violent animal rights 
and environmental protesters were also growing in notoriety.  At the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle in 1999, a group named the Direct Action 
Network had planned to stage non-violent protests against the actions of the agricultural 
and trading groups participating in the meetings.  However, when the day to initiate the 
actions arrived, a number of more violent participants had mixed with those that planned 
on peaceful protests.  Therefore, while many of the events on November 30, 1999 were 




of Seattle, some actions escalated into violence leading to police confrontation.  As a 
result, the protests received much negative media attention.  The New York Times even 
erroneously claimed that several of the protestors were throwing Molotov Cocktails at 
responding police officers (Christian, 2000).  Importantly, media sources also failed to 
distinguish between the non-violent protestors and the violent ones who clashed with the 
police.  As such, the entire movement was associated with the disruptive actions at the 
WTO meetings.  The incidents of disruption and protest may also have increased pressure 
for the government to direct its attention toward left-wing radical groups who reporters 
deem to be threatening the safety of police officers and committing destructive crimes.  
Furthermore, the protests at the WTO deepened the federal government’s commitment to 
protect business interests and establish a general policy to concentrate on crimes costly to 
business operations or detrimental to property.  However, the blurred line that the WTO 
protests had cast between non-violent lawbreakers and violent terrorists played a role in 
influencing the nature of government actions to come.  As a result, many members of 
non-violent groups feared that measures taken to stop terrorist groups were also targeting 
them (Potter 2006).  
Following the growing influence ALF and ELF attained in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the Federal Government, particularly the FBI, began to focus more critically 
on counterterrorism measures aimed at stopping their attacks.  In February 2001, Louis 
Freeh, the director of the FBI, testified before Congress and named ELF the number one 
domestic terrorist threat.  Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, terrorism, on 
both an international and domestic front, became even more of a mainstream concern and 




laws passed that focused on animal rights and environmental extremist groups.  In 2003, 
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) proposed a bill called the Animal 
and Ecological Terrorist Act that strove to provide more of a punitive divide between 
those that vandalize and those that vandalize with intent to cause permanent damage and 
for the expressed purpose or intent to coerce.  The bill would also have redefined an 
animal rights or environmental terrorist group as comprising of two or more people who, 
at the minimum, support “politically-motivated activity” (American Legislative 
Exchange Council 2003).  In May 2004, John Lewis, the FBI’s deputy assistant director, 
petitioned Congress to pass stricter laws against those who influence others to commit 
terrorist actions against animal enterprises, even when they do not physically commit the 
acts themselves.  Lewis’ testimony is found in Animal Rights: Activism vs. Criminality 
(2004).  In December 2005 and January 2006, the FBI merged several independent 
investigations to create Operation Backfire, wherein they initially indicted thirteen people 
on charges of terror, including 11 members of the group The Family.  The Family was a 
close-knit unit of ELF and ALF members who committed arson attacks in the United 
States together and claimed responsibility in the name of either ELF or ALF.  Another 
notable occurrence involved the prosecution of the Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty-7 
(SHAC-7).  Seven people had constructed a website with the intent of inciting others to 
interrupt the day-to-day operations of the Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS) research lab’s 
United States campus in East Millstone, New Jersey.  Due in part both to the increased 
movement to target animal rights and environmental terrorists and the increased pressure 
applied by large businesses affected by such attacks, the SHAC-7 were charged with 




six of the seven were convicted on March 2, 2006.  Finally, in November 2006, the 
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) was signed into law.  Among other provisions, 
which I will discuss in detail later, the law created stiffer penalties for tertiary targeting, 
which prohibited intentional damage of property belonging to anyone with an association 
to an animal enterprise.  This particular stipulation of the law directly links to the ruling 
in the SHAC-7 trial, as the SHAC-7 website operators often posted addresses or phone 
numbers of employees working for businesses associated with Huntingdon Life Sciences.  
In introducing the expansive list of laws and crackdowns, the government aimed 
to deter domestic terrorism by ALF and ELF, among other groups.  However, one can 
theorize that the actions also had an effect on non-terrorist law-breaking activities that the 
laws were not expressly targeting.  In criminological literature, this would be akin to 
examining the potential displacement and diffusion effects of these laws.  In this 
situation, the evidence would predict a diffusion of benefits, which would occur if non-
violent law-breaking activities decreased after the implementation of government laws 
and actions targeting terrorism.  Perhaps, for example, non-violent law-breaking groups 
perceived the government actions as ambiguous and overly vague and took fewer actions 
out of fear that the government could misconstrue their actions as terrorism.  
This thesis will examine the effect that government actions had on both its 
intended target, terrorist actions, and its unintended target, non-violent law-breaking 
actions by both terrorist groups and non-terrorist groups.  To examine the impact on 
terrorist attacks, this thesis will examine the deterrent impact of the actions on the 
number of terrorist attacks committed by animal rights and environmental groups.  By 




forms of crime subsequent to the government actions.  Finally, this paper will examine 
the impact of the government actions on the number of non-violent law-breaking actions 
undertaken by non-terrorist groups.  A decrease in the number of actions would suggest 





















Chapter 2: Deterrence, Displacement, and Diffusion of Benefits 
 This chapter establishes the theoretical precedent to provide context for the 
potential influence of the notable government laws and actions on law-breaking activity.  
I begin by explaining how these government actions might deter terrorism and then 
consider other unexpected consequences of deterrence efforts, particularly how the laws 
and actions might have led terrorist and non-terrorist groups to change their non-violent 
law-breaking. 
Deterrence 
Ideas concerning the connection between deterrence and crime began with the 
writings of Thomas Hobbes (1928 [1651]), Cesare Beccaria (1986 [1764]), and Jeremy 
Bentham (1970 [1789]).  Hobbes posited the idea of a social contract, wherein each 
person in a society is willing to hold others responsible for acting within the confines of 
the rules.  As such, the punishment for the crime must outweigh the hedonistic benefits 
the crime would provide.  Beccaria and Bentham further stressed that the severity of the 
punishment need only be proportional to the severity of the committed offense.  If 
punishments were equivalent across offenses, then criminals would commit the worst 
offense possible.  Beccaria also stressed two points that are salient to the current study.  
First, he argued that an objective determination of the severity of the crime should 
depend on how much harm the crime causes to society.  Second, in order the have the 
greatest deterrent effect, laws must be clearly written and publically available.  All three 
philosophers stressed that the threat of punishment must be credible.  Punishment must be 




Later criminologists argued that deterrence could be divided by whether it is 
specific or general.  Specific deterrence refers to the deterrence of an offender who has 
directly experienced punishment.  General deterrence is a more nebulous term and 
several criminologists have attempted to define and expand the concept.  Early 
criminological research had conceptualized general deterrence as the effect a policy had 
on those in society who witnessed or were told of the punishment without actually 
experiencing it themselves (Andenaes 1974; Gibbs 1975).  For example, the SHAC-7 
prosecution may have had a residual impact on the perception of other potential 
lawbreakers.  Gibbs (1986) was the first to explore general deterrence in greater detail, 
positing a general deterrence paradigm that separated objective and perceived measures 
of severity, celerity, and certainty.  He also attempted to account for the degree to which 
offenders knew of the potential ranges of punishments they might receive for certain 
types of crimes.  Williams and Hawkins (1986) criticized previous general deterrence 
literature for only considering legal sanctions.  The authors reasoned that extralegal 
sanctions, such as social stigma and loss of standing in the community, ought to be 
considered in all empirical studies of general deterrence (see also Paternoster et al. 1983).  
Finally, Stafford and Warr (1993) re-conceptualized general deterrence by speculating on 
the effect of an indirect experience with punishment.  The authors questioned the 
distinction between specific and general deterrence, reasoning that both forms often 
subjected themselves to the same people.  Therefore, the authors reasoned that general 
deterrence could actually be someone’s vicarious, or indirect, experience of punishment.  
An example of indirect general deterrence may be avoiding crime because friends, group 




arguments is that empirical examinations of deterrence need to consider one’s 
perceptions of other people’s experience with punishment and avoidance. 
Researchers rely upon rational choice theory to explain the concept of deterrence.  
Deriving from the work of early philosophers, rational choice theorists assume that 
human beings are rational actors that weigh the pros and cons of offending before they 
commit a crime.  As Beccaria posited, the negative impact of punishment must outweigh 
the hedonistic pleasure seeking that is fundamental to behavior.  Clarke and Cornish 
(1985) and Cornish and Clarke (1987) first applied the economics-based rational choice 
theory to criminology.  The authors reasoned that one’s decision to commit a crime 
depends on factors such as “the potential rewards of crime and the degree of effort 
required” (Clarke and Cornish 1985: 137).   
Rational choice theory has widely been used to explain terrorism.  Enders and 
Sandler (1993) reasoned that members of a terrorist group are attempting to achieve a 
shared goal and respond rationally to attempts at constraining the achievability of that 
goal.  Furthermore, as noted by LaFree and Dugan (2009), terrorist groups members can 
perceive either internal benefits, such as group morale, or external benefits, such as 
increased media attention or a more effective message for propaganda.  As such, there 
have been several avenues policy-makers have taken in an attempt to influence the 
decisions of these rational actors, namely to increase the certainty of punishment 
(primarily through target hardening) or to increase the severity of punishment.  Empirical 
examinations have yielded mixed results.  For example, Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero 
(2005) tested the effect of the 1973 installation of metal detectors in airports on 




although non-terrorists did seem to be deterred.  LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) tested 
the effect of policies employed by the British government in attempts to eradicate 
terrorist groups in Northern Ireland.  The authors found that, save for one military 
operation, there was actually a backlash effect.  The policies did not deter terrorists, as 
attacks actually increased following the intervention.  Northern Ireland terrorist groups 
noted that the perceived brutality of the government forces only increased the rewards 
they might gain from committing a terrorist act.  A backlash effect is not the only result 
that might occur from deterrent measures.  Two other potential results, displacement of 
crime and diffusion of benefits, are discussed next.  Each of these dynamics is an 
unintended, but important, consequence that warrants careful consideration when 
analyzing a deterrent policy. 
Displacement of Crime 
As situational crime prevention became a larger part of criminological research in 
the 1970s, studies began to recognize that deterrent policies had other unexpected effects.  
A study by Press (1971) examined the impact of police presence on street crime in New 
York City and found that while the presence reduced crime in the targeted areas, it 
increased in adjacent districts.  Another study by Chaiken et al. (1974) found that when 
buses required exact change, the number of bus robberies decreased but the number of 
subway robberies increased.  Several other situational crime prevention studies in the 
1970s similarly found that crime reduction efforts displaced crime to other situations 
(Lateef 1974, Tyrpak 1975).  To describe these findings, Reppetto (1976) formally 
introduced the term “displacement.” Criminals were reacting to the prevention strategies 




to law enforcement.  In the language of rational choice theory, displacement would occur 
when other crimes would yield the same benefits without increasing the perceived risks 
or effort undertaken (Clarke and Weisburd 1994).  Accordingly, Reppetto (1976) 
identified five different types of displacement.  The first, spatial displacement, changes 
the location at which the crime is committed.  The second, temporal displacement, 
changes the time at which the crime is committed.  The third, target displacement, 
changes the target of the crime.  The fourth, tactical displacement, changes the type of 
method that is used to commit the crime.  The fifth, functional displacement, changes the 
type of crime that is committed.  A sixth category, added by Barr and Pease (1990), is 
perpetrator displacement, which changes the physical perpetrator committing the crime.  
An example of this might result after the arrest of gang members.  Instead of crime 
ceasing, other gang members typically assume the role of the arrested members. 
In the existing study, displacement, specifically tactical displacement, will be 
evidenced if government actions resulted in decrease in terrorism but an increase in other 
criminal actions by terrorist groups.  That is, displacement would stipulate that terrorist 
groups displace their activities to arenas that should not be under the auspices of 
government actions meant to curtail terrorism.    
Diffusion of Benefits 
In the late 1980s, situational crime prevention studies began to discover that 
displacement of crime was not inevitable.  Some authors found deterrent effects without 
additional residuals.  Mayhew et al. (1989) found that helmet-wearing laws reduced 




Mayhew (1988) found that de-toxifying the gas used in homes led to fewer gas-related 
suicides and did not affect the suicide rate for other methods.   
Other authors expanded upon these findings and discovered that sometimes a 
policy’s impact extended beyond targeted deterrence.  Poyner (1988) found that putting 
cameras on city buses reduced vandalism both on those buses and on non-targeted buses.  
This beneficial effect of an intervention was also found in a pair of studies measuring 
residential burglary.  Not only did the protected houses experience less burglary, but 
other houses in the neighborhood did as well (Lindsay and McGillis 1986; Forrester et al. 
1988).  Miethe (1991: 422) labeled this phenomenon the “free-rider effect.”  
Clarke and Weisburd (1994: 169) more formally introduced the concept of a 
diffusion of benefits commensurate with rational choice theory defined as the “spread of 
the beneficial influence of an intervention beyond the places which are directly targeted, 
the individuals who are the subject of control, the crimes which are the focus of 
intervention or the time periods in which an intervention is brought.”  Diffusion of 
benefits occurs when potential offenders are unsure of whether the laws extend to the 
crime the thief intended to commit.  This uncertainty might be related to the length of 
time a policy will last, the area of space covered by the policy, or the exact nature of the 
policy’s parameters.  An example of the last uncertainty might be confusion regarding the 
target and scope of the policy.   
Both Clarke and Weisburd (1994) and Clarke and Eck (2005) note that it makes 
substantive sense that the types of crime displacement can also be considered as types of 
diffusion of benefits, only on the opposite end of the spectrum.  Table 1, reproduced from 




displacement is missing) of crime displacement can be fitted to the diffusion of benefits.  
Given that there exists a recognizable faction of non-terrorist groups that protest and 
occasionally break the law through non-violent tactics, as opposed to the terrorist groups 
who the legal sanctions mean to target, this thesis examines potential tactical diffusion of 
benefits effects. 
Table 1-A reproduction from Clarke and Eck (2005) showing the contrast of displacement of crime and 








for Displacement of Crime and Diffusion of Benefits 
Examining potential displacement and diffusion of benefits effects has proven to be 
worthwhile and informative to criminological policy.  In fact, in a manual intended to 
guide problem-oriented policing studies, Clarke and Eck (2005) mandate checking for 
displacement and diffusion effects as part of a scientific study.  Extant research has 
shown that many evaluations of interventions do find some sort of displacement or 
diffusion of benefits effect.  For instance, meta-analyses conducted separately by Eck 
(1993) and Hesseling (1994) examined studies that explicitly looked for a displacement 
of crime after an intervention and found some supportive evidence.  Eck only found 
evidence in 3 out of 33 studies, while Hesseling found evidence in 33 out of 55.  Of the 
Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits for Burglary of Apartments 
Type Definition Displacement Diffusion 
Geographical  Geographic 
Change 
Switch to another building Reduce burglaries in targeted 
building and in nearby buildings 
Temporal Time Switch Switch from day to 
evening 





Switch from apartments to 
houses 
Reduce burglaries in apartments 
and houses 
Tactical  Change in 
method of 
offending 
Switch from unlocked 
doors to picking locks 




Switch from burglary to 
theft 




two, only Hesseling also looked for potential diffusion of benefits by focusing on the 
studies for which he did not find displacement effects.  Hesseling found that six studies 
supported a diffusion of benefits hypothesis.  A later meta-analysis conducted by 
Guerette and Bowers (2009) was the first to assess research that explicitly looked for a 
diffusion of benefits at the same time as displacement.  The authors found that, of the 574 
observations contained within the 102 studies (several studies examined multiple forms 
of displacement or diffusion of benefits), diffusion of benefits and displacement effects 
were found in 27% and 26% respectively.  Especially pertinent to this study, the meta-
analysis found that of the 49 observations measuring tactical effects, 17 revealed either 
displacement or diffusion of benefits.  
Specific criminological studies have also focused more closely on potential 
tactical displacement of crime and diffusion of benefit effects.  A study completed by 
Vijlbrief (2012) examined how drug dealers adapted to new regulations by the Dutch 
government attempting to limit the availability of the chemicals needed to make ecstasy 
and methamphetamine.  The author found evidence of tactical displacement; the targeted 
dealers shifted tactics either by trying to use other chemicals to make their drugs or by 
producing the banned essential chemicals by using their own methods.  Another study 
conducted by Holt, Blevins, and Kuhns (2008) found evidence of tactical displacement 
by johns in response to increased police monitoring.  When street patrols were especially 
heavy, johns would typically employ prostitutes that worked indoors, such as in escort 
services or illegitimate massage parlors.  Other examples of tactical displacement 
included johns putting in-state license plates on their cars to avoid police stopping them 




overt risk of detection.  A third study conducted by Ratcliffe and Makkai (2004) 
examined the effect of Operation Anchorage, a policing crackdown aimed at reducing 
burglary in two different areas of the Australian Capital Territory.  Additionally, the 
authors measured the rate of vehicular crimes before and after the operation.  Using one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVAs), the authors found that there was a significant 
decrease in both burglary and crime against vehicles after the Operation.  This evidences 
a tactical diffusion of benefits, where the offenders have altered their “modus operandi” 
(Bowers and Johnson 2003: 276) in committing property crime. 
Displacement and diffusion of benefits have been less extensively examined in 
studies of counterterrorism tactics’ effectiveness.  Many that found displacement or 
diffusion effects have done so in the context of examining police actions taken after a 
large terrorist attack.  Two studies have found evidence of a tactical diffusion of benefits 
that occurred after policy decisions reacting to terrorism.  Draca, Machin, and Witt 
(2008) examined the impact of Operation Theseus, a large-scale increase in police 
deployment in five central boroughs of London after the July 7, 2005 tube attacks, and 
concluded that a 34% increase in police presence led to a 13% decrease in crime.  
Furthermore, the authors tested to see if crime was geographically displaced into 
neighboring boroughs and found no supportive evidence.  Di Tella and Schargrodsky 
(2004) examined police presence in Buenos Aires following a terrorist attack on a Jewish 
Community Center in 1994.  Police were assigned 24-hour stations at every Jewish 
institution throughout the city to protect against another potential terrorist attack.  
Whether a result of the police presence or not, there were no subsequent terrorist attacks.  




with an increased police presence were significantly lower than those in other 
neighborhoods, which represents a tactical diffusion of benefits because the initial police 
presence was designed to stop those who commit terrorist acts, not those who break into 
cars.   
Other scholars have examined the effects of counterterrorism measures that target 
funding sources.  These studies have typically found evidence of displacement 
concerning the tactics used to raise money.  For example, research conducted by O’Neill 
(2007) found that tactics such as targeting charities or adding banking regulations might 
have been ineffective because groups found different methods to launder money.  
Similarly, Hamm (2007) conducted a case study of a crackdown on Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) fundraising in the United States in the 1970s and found that, as a result, the 
IRA committed more serious crimes, such as extortion and bank robbery, to finance its 
activities.  
Relatedly, a study by Enders and Sandler (1993) examined the effectiveness of 
counter-terrorism policies designed to inhibit specific types of terrorist attacks on 
complementary or easily substitutable attack types.  The authors used Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) to analyze how an intervention might affect the number of attacks 
on several different attack types.  The authors discovered that a number of the policies 
caused a tactical displacement or target displacement.  For example, installations of metal 
detectors in airports led to a decrease in hijackings but an increase in other sorts of 
hostage attacks and an increase in assassinations.  The authors found no evidence that the 





Finally, Hsu and Apel (2015) examined the impact that placement of metal 
detectors had on various forms on terrorist attacks, following the example set by Sandler 
and Enders (1993).  The authors found evidence in favor of both displacement and 
diffusion of benefits.  The results showed an increase in bomb attacks on non-aviation 
targets following the intervention, supportive of displacement.  However, there was also 
evidence of a diffusion of benefits, demonstrated, for example, in a decrease in other 
attacks on aviation industry targets (e.g. airports writ large, not just hijackings) after the 
installation of metal detectors.  The authors also found a diffusion of benefits to non-
aviation targets and attack types, such as fewer attacks on diplomatic targets and fewer 
assassinations and hostage takings.   
Notably, very little of the extant literature has explicitly connected its findings 
back to the larger criminological considerations.  This study will attempt to address this 
shortcoming by expressly framing the analysis to discern deterrence, displacement, and 
diffusion of benefits and then expressing the relevance of the findings within the larger 










Chapter 3: Context of the Government Actions 
In the previous section, I established a general theoretical guideline for framing 
the relationship between government actions and reactions by terrorist groups and other 
lawbreakers.  In order to connect the framework to the extant study, it is important to 
convey, in detail, the temporal progression of the government’s agenda to deter animal-
rights and environmental terrorism.  While the majority of laws and actions occurred after 
September 11, 2001, I first discuss the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) that 
was passed in 1992 in order to establish a baseline upon which future laws will be built.  
 The 1992 AEPA was the first to create an offense named animal enterprise 
terrorism.  A terrorist was prescribed to include anyone who participates in “interstate or 
foreign commerce” and “intentionally damages or causes the loss of any property 
(including animals or records) used by the animal enterprise, or conspires to do so.”  The 
AEPA also detailed several sentencing guidelines for crimes committed under the new 
statute.  There were four notable provisions within these guidelines.  The first 
conditioned that causing less than $10,000 in damages would result in fines and a 
possible prison term for up to six months.  The second conditioned that causing more 
than $10,000 in damages would result in fines and a possible prison term for up to three 
years.  The third provision conditioned that any attack of terrorism resulting in serious 
bodily harm would result in fines and up to 20 years in prison.  Finally, any attack that 
caused death would result in fines and up to life in prison.   
 In 1996, Congress amended the AEPA with the intention to expand some of the 
provisions and clarifying others.  There were two main notable changes made.  First, 




then revised for each new level of severity.  For example, a new sub-section of the law 
stipulated that when an animal enterprise terrorist offense exceeded $100,000 and 
resulted in substantial bodily damage, the prison term should fall between five and ten 
years.  This remains semantically different from the proviso that the AEPA created in 
1992 to account for an attack that might cause serious bodily damage.  Second, there 
were also amendments to previous penalty recommendations.  Causing less than $10,000 
in damages became grounds for up to a year in prison instead of a six-month maximum.  
Causing between $10,000 and $100,000 in damage also became punishable by up to five 
years in prison instead of three years.   
 In 1999, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) proposed an amendment to the Violent 
and Repeat Juvenile Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999 that would 
have also implemented changes to the AEPA with an eye toward three main purposes.  
The first was to establish a database of attacks against animal enterprises or any business 
engaging in commercial activity thought to be disrupting the environment.  The database 
would be produced in cooperation with the ATF, maintained at a national clearinghouse, 
and publicized for use by the appropriate law enforcement agencies.  The second purpose 
was to include a section stipulating that, no matter the presence of humans, the damaging 
or destroying of a property by means of a fire or explosive device would mandate 
anywhere from a five to twenty year prison sentence.  The third purpose was to increase 
the potential severity of punishment.  Hatch proposed to increase the maximum penalty 
for committing less than $10,000 damage to a five-year prison term and to add the 
possibility of a death sentence to attacks that resulted in death.  While the Senate 




 On December 5, 2001, Representative George Nethercutt (R-Washington) 
proposed the Agroterrorism Prevention Act, which would have been very similar to 
Hatch’s amendment to the Juvenile Justice Act.  The Bill called for increased penalties, 
added a provision that allowed for the death penalty in attacks that result in death, and 
established an incident database through collaboration with the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) called the National Agroterrorism Incident Clearinghouse.  One of the 
main departing points from previous legislation was that the Bill would also include 
attacks against plant enterprises as well as animal enterprises.  The second new idea in 
the Bill proposed to award scholarships and grants to colleges and universities to improve 
security against attacks and to develop security reports and education exercises designed 
to increase awareness regarding potential attacks.  As with Hatch’s amendment, the Bill 
was not signed into law. 
 In 2002, Congress amended the AEPA in several ways.  Most importantly, the 
new law eliminated the requirement that an attack cause physical disruption to an animal 
enterprise.  Now, causing any permanent damage to an animal enterprise’s property was 
enough to warrant inclusion under the statute.  Furthermore, the law expanded 
punishment to include restitution for any economic damage that resulted from the 
offense.    
In 2004 and 2005, the Senate and House of Representatives hosted hearings to 
discuss the extant threat from environmental and animal rights activities.  A goal was to 
crack down on those who targeted tertiary entities, such as spouses of company workers 
or companies that have contracts or collaborate with an offending company.  The 




the HLS.  However, those that opposed the Bill worried that it created too strong a 
connection between the attacks of September 11 and the actions perpetrated by animal 
rights and environmental extremists.  At the 2004 hearing, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-
Vermont) expressed surprise at the language used in the hearing, stating 
When most Americans think of threats that currently face this country, we do not 
mean "animal and eco-terrorism.”  Indeed, most Americans would not consider 
the harassment of animal testing facilities to be "terrorism," any more than they 
would consider anti-globalization protestors or anti-war protestors or women's 
health activists to be terrorists.  This Administration aggressively stamps 
everything with a ‘terrorism’ label…  But even this Administration had not up 
until now, as far as I know, thought the Animal Enterprise Protection Act a major 
component of its "war on terrorism."   
The final, and most controversial, piece of legislation, the Animal Enterprise 
Terrorism Act (AETA), was passed by the House of Representative on November 13, 
2006 and signed into law by the president two weeks later.  The AETA expanded upon 
previous actions with several key edits and distinctions (Potter, n.d.).  The first change is 
that the AEPA had previously qualified an offense as one that has the “purpose of 
causing physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise.”  In the AETA this 
criteria was broadened to include those offenses aiming to damage or interfere with the 
actions of an animal enterprise.  More importantly the law expanded the motivations one 
might have in their action to consider it an act of terrorism.  While the AEPA said that the 
perpetrator must “intentionally damage or cause of the loss of any property…used by the 




the intent to “place a person in reasonable fear” of death or bodily injury to them or their 
partner by any sort of method.  The most important new aim of the AETA was to crack 
down on what it termed as “tertiary targeting.”  The AETA expanded the term “animal 
enterprise” to encompass any entity that “uses or sells animals or animal products.”  
Then, the act included any action that targets not only the animal enterprise, but also any 
person or business that has a connection with the animal enterprise.  Examples of this 
included both legal actions (such as phone blockades, vigils staged at people’s houses, 
email blockades, and peaceful protests) and illegal actions (such as economic sabotage, 
setting off stink bombs in offices, damaging cars, and subscribing office workers to 
pornographic magazines).  Another key inclusion in the AETA was the ability to punish 
conspiracy to commit attacks in the same manner as a completed attack.  Members of the 
general animal and environmental rights community met this provision with 
consternation because they felt it was unfair to punish harshly those that might have 
changed their mind about committing an attack.  There was also no precedent for such a 
legal stipulation.  Finally, and most importantly, the provision created the impression that 
the laws were targeting the entire animal rights and environmental cause rather than 
violent terrorist groups (Kuipers 2011; Potter n.d.; Johnson 2007).  
The penalty section of the AETA also expanded upon previous legislation.  For 
example, an action that may result in loss of profits but not in bodily injury, death, or 
property loss or damage had an associated punishment of up to one year in prison.  
However, on November 13, 2006, Representative Robert Scott (D-Virginia) 
acknowledged in Congress that one might expand the interpretation of the first provision 




cited an example of a protest aimed at stopping trucks from delivering supplies to a 
company.  While he acknowledged that they would be violating trespassing and 
obstruction laws, he worried that this might be punished more severely under the auspices 
of the AETA.  As such, the AETA had the potential to infringe upon protesting, which is 
guaranteed by the first amendment.  Non-violent advocates also expressed concern over 
the potential for loose interpretation of the statutes (McCoy 2007; Lovitz 2007).  I will 
expand upon this in detail later in this thesis. 
In addition to the major legislative changes that were proposed or enacted, the 
federal government undertook a highly publicized action, Operation Backfire, and 
prosecuted a group called the SHAC-7 in order to deter other animal rights and 
environmental terrorists.  These actions indeed are an exemplar of general deterrence, in 
that their focus on a smaller group of people is posited to affect a larger population’s 
perceived risk of apprehension and severe punishment.  Operation Backfire occurred in 
late 2005 and early 2006.  The impetus for the action began in 2003 when FBI 
investigators turned Jacob Ferguson, an activist who had participated in several 
environmentally motivated arson attacks across the United Sates, into an informer.  Using 
Ferguson’s information, the FBI was able to create an investigative team to track 
movements of radical group members about whom he provided information, in particular 
a nebulous group of participants called The Family.  A joint interagency taskforce was 
established to track down members of the Family who committed a string of arson and 
destructive attacks under the auspices of ALF or ELF.  The task force was able to arrest 
11 members of the Family whom they claimed were instrumental in orchestrating or 




defendants terrorists and sought to prosecute the cases with a “terrorism enhancement” 
provision that had the potential to add up to 20 years in prison because the crime was 
intended to “promote a federal crime of terrorism” (Harris, 2007).  Although many 
animal rights and environmental activists argued that the Family’s crimes were solely 
protesting companies that were destroying the environment, and contained no 
preconceptions of influencing political beliefs, the presiding judge qualified many of the 
cases for the terrorism enhancement in United States v. Thurston (2007).  This rather 
draconian ruling provoked fear not only in remaining members of ALF and ELF but in 
animal rights and environmental activists who were concerned that a liberal interpretation 
of the AETA and the terrorism enhancement penalty might be applied to non-violent 
activities and protests they undertook (Potter 2006). 
The final notable event that occurred around this time was the prosecution and 
conviction of the SHAC-7 beginning in May 2004.  The SHAC-7 were seven individuals, 
from the larger SHAC campaign, who created a website dedicated to inciting action 
against the HLS animal research facility’s campus in New Jersey.  While the defendants 
did not actually partake in any physical action against the company, they posted 
information on their website to support those who would take action.  Examples of such 
information included addresses, phone numbers, and fax numbers of companies and 
company employees or locations of protests and meetings.  Furthermore, SHAC’s 
website documented any action that activists undertook in protest of HLS.  More active 
SHAC members engaged in activities that targeted those who provided HLS with money; 
therefore, they targeted those businesses with stock in HLS, those that provided shipping 




for the AETA to include provisions accounting for inciting fear in people related to those 
who were perceived to have violated either animal or environmental rights.   
As this was before the enactment of the AETA, the seven individuals who were 
indicted were charged under a provision of the AEPA covering conspiracy to commit 
interstate stalking and using the internet to further interstate stalking.  The indictment 
frightened those who undertake legal protests and actions primarily because it implied 
that one could be held responsible for any illegal or terrorist action undertaken by a 
different group done to further the general cause (Parker 2009).  For example, the 
indictment raised the concern that if protesters encouraged others to also protest and they 
then engaged in illegal acts, the encouragers might be held liable.  As such, legal activists 
worried that the indictment was interpreting the law in a way that jeopardized their first 




















Chapter 4: Applying Deterrence, Displacement, and Diffusion to 
This Study 
 
In the context of the current study, there are at least four possible outcomes from 
implementing the laws, shown in Table 21.   
Table 2- Selected possible outcomes from government actions 
 
The first outcome would be no effect on terrorist actions.  To effectively discuss the 
remaining three outcomes, it is best to separate the relevant actors into two entities: 1) 
animal-rights and environmental terrorists and 2) animal-rights and environmental non-
terrorists.  Given that dichotomy, the second possible outcome from the government 
actions would be evidence that supported deterrence only.  This would occur if, after the 
                                                 
1 There are at least two possible outcomes considered, but not included in the provided table.  The first 
supports a backlash effect.  In this case, the number of terrorist acts would increase after the government 
implemented its actions.  A backlash effect might also explain a rise in non-terrorist acts by non-terrorist 
groups.  If groups do not consider the government actions to be legitimate, or consider the actions 
excessive, backlash might occur.  However, in this situation, the main targets of these groups’ actions are 
companies that endanger animals or the environment and not the government.  Therefore, backlash is 
theoretically unjustified in this scenario.  The second set of outcomes are the remaining permutations that 
can occur which do not neatly fit within any paradigm.  For example, a policy results in increased 
terrorism, decreased non-terrorism by terrorist groups, and increased non-terrorism by non-terrorist groups.  
While these results are possible, I have not included them in Table 1 both because of parsimony and 
because of their lack of fit into any sort of rationale.    
 
Type Supportive Empirical Finding 
No Effect Government actions have no impact on acts of terrorism or non-
terrorism 
Deterrence Only Government actions cause a decrease in acts of terrorism 
Displacement Government actions cause a decrease in acts of terrorism, but an 
increase in other criminal actions 
Diffusion of Benefits Government actions cause a decrease in acts of terrorism as well as a 




AETA, Operation Backfire, and the prosecution of the SHAC-7, the number of acts of 
terrorism decreased but the number of acts of non-terrorism remained steady.   
The third and fourth possible outcomes also relate to the impact of the 
government actions on the number of non-terrorist actions.  The third outcome would 
occur if terrorist groups replaced violent terrorist acts with non-terrorist crimes after the 
government targeted terrorism.  The logic behind displacement would dictate that, in 
order to pursue their goals and avoid serious punishment, members of animal-rights and 
environmental terrorist groups would shift their tactics to those not targeted by the 
government actions, such as non-violent law breaking.  The fourth outcome would 
evidence a diffusion of benefits if the number of non-violent law-breaking actions by 
non-terrorist groups decreased after the implementation of the government actions.  
Criminological literature emphasizes the need to examine displacement and 
diffusion of benefits in crime-control studies.  Additionally, reaction from lawmakers and 
non-violent activists, in this scenario, provide further evidence that a diffusion of benefits 
is a possible outcome from the government policies.  First, several of the statutes from 
the AETA can be broadly interpreted.  Lovitz (2007) notes that the use of the word 
“disrupt” in some of the language, e.g. “disrupting economic activity,” may be interpreted 
in many different ways, including events where non-violent protesters indirectly impact 
work productivity.  McCoy (2007) further notes that the term “animal enterprise” is 
overly broad in this particular law because it could include both companies that operate 
legally and those that operate unlawfully.  While a clause in the AETA makes an 
exception in the case of unlawful competitive animal events, such as cockfights, animal-




interference with other illegal enterprises may be interpreted as falling under the statute.  
Authors have also shared apprehension over the use of the words “interfere” and 
“property” to describe a potential penalty under the law (McCoy 2007; Israel 2006; 
Cronin 2013).  McCoy particularly stresses the importance of the word “property,” which 
she notes might encompass intangible quantities such as loss of profits or poor publicity.  
These results, the author notes, are exactly what the non-violent protesters are aiming to 
cause.   
A second argument is that many of the AETA statutes are too vague.  Cronin 
(2013) worried about the ambiguity of the new laws regarding tertiary targeting, 
criticizing the use of the phrase “connection to an intimate partner” when describing an 
example of tertiary targeting.  Intimate partner might have any of a range of definitions; 
one might argue that the partner does not necessarily need to reside at the same location 
as the offending worker.  “Connection,” too, is a vague construct, in that one may possess 
any strength of relationship with someone to establish a “connection.”  While the law 
explicitly notes that it is not meant “to prohibit any expressive conduct (including 
peaceful picketing or other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal prohibition by 
the First Amendment to the Constitution,” many people, such as Dennis Kucinich (D-
Ohio), still expressed trepidation that the potentially broadly-defined terms would have a 
“chill” upon the First Amendment constitution rights of protest.  Indeed, there is some 
evidence that the law intended to include non-violent protesters under its auspices.  An 
analysis done by Potter (n.d.) noted that one of the earlier versions of the act penalizes an 
offense that was “exclusively a non-violent physical obstruction” that “may result in loss 




allows for a penalty for an offense that does not instill the reasonable fear of bodily injury 
or death (AETA 2006, emphasis added).  Potter and others worried about the vague 
nature of this penalty: could it extend to non-violent protesters?  McCoy (2007) also 
reasoned that each part of AETA was already appropriately encompassed in the letter of 
other extant laws. 
Indeed, many activists and analysts have expressed concern at the potential for those who 
only participate in non-violent actions to be arrested and prosecuted under the confines of 
AETA (Lovitz 2007; Pannekoek 2014).  In 2009, police arrested four people for passing 
out pamphlets and drawing chalk slogans on the sidewalk.  Prosecutors charged the four 
under the auspices of the AETA and in 2010, a judge dismissed the case, stating that the 
case in no way met the definition of terrorism used by the Federal Government (United 
States v. Buddenburg, 2010).  Another case (Blum v. Holder, 2013) was heard in a 
Massachusetts District Appeals Court, where activists appealed the legality of the AETA 
because it was eroding first amendment rights, specifically that it engaged in “content and 
viewpoint discrimination.”  The suit claimed that the Act is not neutral because it 
supports industries and businesses that are on one side of the political spectrum.  The 
filers of the suit worried further that such discrimination would persist and continue to 
erode First Amendment rights as businesses become more powerful in the political arena.  
A judge dismissed the case in 2014 because the plaintiffs lacked proper standing to go to 
court.2    
                                                 
2 In reading the discussion of the AETA and its provisions, it is difficult to discern which precise acts the 
law would stipulate as terrorist acts.  Given that the act has the word terrorism in it, and a uniform 
definition of terrorism is necessary for subsequent empirical analyses (which use the FBI’s definition), I 
assume that the act is meant to deter only activities that conform to the FBI’s definition.  Although it falls 
outside the intent of this study, an analysis that measured the relationship between the government actions 
and all animal rights and environmental group actions (terrorist and non-terrorist) was substantively no 




Empirical Examinations of Government Actions Related to Animal-Rights and 
Environmental Terrorism 
Given that there has been a spate of Federal actions enacted with a goal of 
deterring animal-rights and environmentally motivated terrorist attacks, their 
effectiveness should be assessed.  However, to date, only a few studies have described 
trends in animal rights and environmental terrorism over time, even fewer have attempted 
to identify a deterrent effect in any of the measures taken, and none, to date, has 
examined potential displacement of crime or diffusion of benefits in relation to the 
measures.  In 1993, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) collaborated to examine the trends in animal rights activity (“Report 
to Congress,” 1993).  The collaborators commissioned the report in response to the 
growing number of animal rights and environmental attacks in the United States.  While 
the investigators conducted no formal statistical analyses, they published a table showing 
a decrease in the number of instances of animal rights extremism from 1991 to 1992 and 
1993.  Furthermore, the authors stated that since the enactment of the AEPA in 1992, no 
one had been formally indicted under the auspices of the legislation.  However, the 
authors avoided making an overt connection between the implementation of the law and 
the decrease in activity.  In fact, they expressed concern that the inactivity early in the 
1990s was reminiscent of an earlier spell of inactivity in the 1980s that preceded a spike 
in action, warning readers of this possibility.  In short, the authors believed the low 
numbers were merely a deviation from the mean and not a decreasing trend. 
                                                                                                                                                 
attacks (results available upon request).  Therefore, in accordance with the established theoretical construct, 




Varriale-Carson (2014) more rigorously assessed the deterrent effects of a number 
of legal sanctions on acts of environmental and animal rights extremism.  Most 
relevantly, the author examined the effects of legal sanctions, choosing to study the 1988 
Anti-Drug Act, the AEPA, and the AETA.  She created the Eco-Incidents Database (the 
same database used in this thesis), encompassing both incidents of terrorism and other 
illegal actions.  In contrast to the current study, Varriale-Carson did not differentiate 
between terrorist groups and non-terrorist groups in her analyses.  Using an interrupted 
time-series analysis, Varriale-Carson (2012) generally found no deterrent effect of 
legislative actions on group activities.  In fact, she noted a steady decline in activity from 
2001 to 2007, regardless of legal sanctioning intervention.  She also ran a similar model 
disaggregating attacks by designated ideology (animal rights versus environmental) and 
found no substantively different results.  The only significant result found in quarterly 
time-series analyses was that the AEPA was followed by an increase in terrorism and 
other destructive activities for the first quarter following initial implementation, in direct 
contrast to what deterrence and rational choice frameworks might predict.   
However, Varriale-Carson (2012, 2014) also conducted several series hazard 
models and found results more consistent with the deterrence framework.  She found that 
the AEPA was significantly related to a decrease in the hazard of another terrorist attack 
and the AETA was significantly related to a decrease in the hazard of an attack motivated 
by animal rights ideology.  Therefore, through the whole study, support for a deterrent 
effect depended on analytic strategy.   
A third study was a case study of Operation Backfire commissioned by the 




(Deshpande and Ernst 2012).  While the authors’ primarily analyzed the counter-
terrorism tactics employed to make the operation a success, they included an informal 
analysis of the trends of attacks, using Operation Backfire, operationalized as occurring 
at “the end of 2005” (Deshpande and Ernst 2012, pp.26) as an interruption in the time 
series.  Using yearly Global Terrorism Database (GTD) data from 1987 to 2010, the 
authors arrive to a conclusion similar to that of Varriale-Carson (2014).  While Operation 
Backfire evidenced a minor deterrent effect (based on descriptive data only), there was a 
clear downward trend in “eco-terrorist” attacks in the United States since their peak 
around 2001.  Therefore, the decline started years before the operation took place.  The 
authors speculate that this trend may have been due to the collapse of the Family in 2001 
after an inter-group disagreement over an attack at the University of Washington.  
However, this study used only GTD data, and therefore subjected its results to the GTD’s 
methodological concerns, which this thesis will address subsequently.  Furthermore, the 
authors failed to implement controls to mitigate such concerns.  Finally, the data were not 
de-trended in any way, so the authors’ conclusions were purely based on a rote 
examination of the yearly trend.  To date, no study has used a more comprehensive 
database, which draws incidents from several different sources, to study the impact of 
Operation Backfire.   
Regardless, extant studies that have attempted to parse apart the effects of various 
actions aimed at deterring animal-rights and environmental terrorists are flawed.  Of the 
three listed studies, only Varriale-Carson (2014) attempted to conduct a rigorous 
statistical test for evidence of a deterrence effect, which is particularly important because 




counterterrorism deterrent measures have neglected to test for possible crime 
displacement or diffusion of benefits.  Finally, I know of no study to date that specifically 
looked at the decision in the SHAC-7 prosecution as a potential legal deterrent, a classic 
case of possible general deterrence. 
Hypotheses 
The intent of the current study is to go beyond typical examinations that only estimate 
deterrence effects of policy in a terrorism context.  This thesis aims to estimate a potential 
crime displacement or diffusion of benefits effect that results from policies and actions 
targeting animal rights and environmental terrorists.  The policies and actions include 
Operation Backfire, the indictment of the SHAC-7, and the implementation of the AETA.  
This thesis tests the effect of these government actions on monthly counts of terrorist and 
non-terrorist law-breaking actions.  The hypotheses, presented under the criminological 
concepts they test, are as follows: 
Deterrence 
𝑯𝟏𝟏:  Terrorist incidents will decrease after the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
(AETA). 
𝑯𝟏𝟏:  Terrorist incidents will decrease after Operation Backfire.  
𝑯𝟏𝟏:  Terrorist incidents will decrease after indictment of the SHAC-7. 
Displacement of Crime 
𝑯𝟐𝟏:  Non-terrorist actions by terrorist groups will increase after implementation 
of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA). 





𝑯𝟐𝟏:  Non-terrorist actions by terrorist groups will increase after implementation 
of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA). 
Diffusion of Benefits 
𝑯𝟑𝟏: Non-terrorist actions by non-terrorist groups will decrease after 
implementation of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA). 
𝑯𝟑𝟏: Non-terrorist actions by non-terrorist groups will decrease after Operation 
Backfire. 
𝑯𝟑𝟏: Non-terrorist actions by non-terrorist groups will decrease after the 







Chapter 5: Data and Methods 
Data 
 This analysis uses monthly counts of events taken from the Eco-Incidents 
Database (EID) (Varriale-Carson et al. 2012).  The database accounts for both terrorist 
activity and non-violent criminal acts committed by animal-rights and environmentally 
motivated terrorist and non-terrorist groups from 1970 through 2007 limited exclusively 
to the United States.  However, since only two events occurred between 1970 and 1977, 
the current study will use data from 1977 to 2007 to limit the number of zeros contained 
in each dependent variable.  The EID is populated with incidents from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) and is supplemented by additional open-source catalogs.  Key 
variables in the database include exact dates of the attacks (when known), the group that 
perpetrated the attack (when known), location of the attack, and an event summary.  
Based on the event summary, I added a dichotomous variable that coded each incident as 
either “terrorism” or “non-terrorism” according to the FBI’s definition of terrorism, 
which is detailed below.  Second, groups were also coded to be terrorist groups if they 
have committed at least one terrorist attack in the database and non-terrorist groups if 
they have not3.  Because so much of the database relies on the GTD, a fuller discussion 
of that database is also warranted. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Individual perpetrators were not specifically addressed either in the database or in this decision-making 
process.  Nearly all of the incident summaries in the EID that suggest that only one person perpetrated the 
incident are paired with a group name, which I deferred to.  One incident, committed by an individual 
named Fran Trutt in November, 1998, was coded as a terrorist incident (which means that Trutt was coded 
as a terrorist group).  Essentially, individual perpetrators, acting outside of an affiliation with a larger group 




Global Terrorism Database 
The GTD is an open-source incident-level database that has amassed information 
on individual terrorist attacks around the world from 1970 to 2013.  The GTD uses a 
comparatively broad and inclusive definition of terrorism: “the threatened or actual use of 
illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through 
fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan 2007, p. 184).  For an incident to be 
included in the dataset, it must meet three overarching criterion (National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2013):  
1. The incident must be an intentional, conscious calculation on the part of the 
perpetrator. 
2. The incident must be violent or entail the threat of violence. 
3. The perpetrators of the attack must be sub-national actors. 
 Additionally, an incident must meet at least two out of the following three sub-
criteria: 
1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.  
Economic goals do not include actions undertaken exclusively to obtain monetary profit. 
2. The act must include the intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to a 
larger audience outside of the immediate victims. 
3. The act must be outside the parameters of legitimate warfare activities, as set by 
International Humanitarian Law. 
 The GTD’s use of these criteria is critical to the current set of analyses, as the 
second overarching criterion of the GTD requires an incident to be violent or entail the 




terrorism, even by the broad guidelines of the GTD.  It is essential to note that the GTD’s 
definition of terrorism is not universally accepted and, in fact, there are many different 
definitions of terrorism   
It is important to note that the EID, by relying so heavily on the GTD for terrorist 
incidents, has three main weaknesses in its incident pool.  First, the GTD’s first 
requirement is that an included incident be intentional.  The internal codebook notes that 
intentionality encapsulates the entirety of the incident, such that an attacker has to be “out 
the door” and beginning the kinetic motion of an attack to be included (START 2013).  
As such, attacks that are foiled by authorities, planned but not carried out, or are 
prematurely carried out (such as a bomb that explodes during assembly) are excluded 
from the GTD4.  It is unclear whether or not the FBI definition would call such incidents 
terrorism; however, a read of the incident summaries in the EID indicates that such a 
tenuous situation was not included in the database at all.  Second, not all incidents in the 
EID have an ascribed group.  In fact, of the 1068 incidents, 243 do not have a group 
name, making it impossible to assess whether the perpetrator was a terrorist or non-
terrorist group.  Dugan (2011b) also stated that media sources may mistakenly attribute 
an attack to a specific group, or different sources may report conflicting perpetrator 
information.  In order to connect a perpetrator group with an incident, the GTD requires 
that a perpetrator group be named within the text of the open-source article itself.  As 
further noted by the codebook, this does not necessary entail any sort of legal culpability.  
However, as perpetrator group is critical to this examination, analyses will only consider 
                                                 
4 To clarify, some foiled attacks are included in the GTD that do accord with the “out the door” principal.  
For instance, a perpetrator aiming to bomb an animal testing facility who physically leaves his house and is 
arrested enroute to the facility would be included in the GTD.  The foiled attacks that do not get included in 




the 825 incidents with group names.  Consequently, the dependent variable will 
necessarily suffer from measurement error, particularly in examining non-terrorist acts, 
for which perpetrator group is essential.  However, there is no particular reason to believe 
that a missing group name is correlated with any of the important variables included in 
subsequent analyses.  Therefore, while there may be additional measurement error in the 
dependent variables, it is unlikely that the results are biased.  Third, the EID suffers from 
typical weaknesses characteristic of open-source databases (Dugan 2011b).  A reliance on 
news sources might bias the database toward more sensational acts of terrorism that are 
more likely to come to the media’s attention.  Furthermore, the EID can only capture 
those incidents that sources report, subjecting the data to any number of biases.  A 
roadside bomb that is safely defused, a fire that is quickly quashed, or a perpetrator who 
authorities detain on the way to an attack is less likely to receive media attention because 
there was no notable outcome.   
 The GTD can be effectively broken down into four collection periods (see Dugan 
2011b for a full discussion of the differences between each period).  The four distinct 
periods introduce another source of potential measurement error in the GTD.  Different 
contractors collected the data found in the GTD for different spans of years5.  
Furthermore, some collectors collected incidents retrospectively and others collected 
incidents prospectively.  Therefore, it is difficult to disentangle what percentage of 
fluctuations in attacks is due to a legitimate change in terrorism and what percentage is 
due to the data collection method.  The span of this study, from 1977 to 2007, only 
                                                 
5 From 1970 to 1997, the GTD (although it was not called the GTD until START began to edit it) was 
collected at Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services, after which it was transferred to START.  The 1998 to 
2007 data was collected retroactively by the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS) 
beginning in 2006.  In spring, 2008 the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) began collecting 




overlaps the first two collection periods.  As such, in this study’s analyses, I will use a 
dummy variable to control for the different collection periods.  
As noted earlier, the GTD data can only address the hypotheses related to 
terrorism.  The second required inclusion criterion stipulates that the act must use, or 
threaten to use, illegal force or violence.  Non-violent law-breaking actions such as spray-
painting a wall, marching with pickets, releasing caged animals, hanging a banner on the 
façade of a building, or locking arms outside a biomedical facility do not meet the 
threshold of violence.  Therefore, the EID requires other sources of data to capture non-
terrorist incidents over time.  The main source of data for non-terrorist incidents was the 
Foundation for Biomedical Research (FBR), which includes incidents from open-source 
data and personal communiques provided by animal rights and environmental terrorist 
groups.  Per Varriale-Carson et al. (2012), all incidents obtained from the FBR were 
cross-checked against GTD cases to prevent double counting.  Varriale-Carson et al. 
(2012) also provides a fuller description of the remaining, more ancillary sources that 
populate the EID.  The EID relied exclusively on open-source data.  Therefore, given that 
much of the data was collected retrospectively, fewer sources collected information on 
actions in earlier decades than in later decades.  As such, even though analyses will 
control for the difference in the number of available sources, there may be other sources 
of measurement error associated with drawing from fewer media outlets.   
Furthermore, the Foundation for Biomedical Research (FBR) is not an impartial 
party in the animal-rights and environmental movement, as it advocated for passage of 
the AETA.  Similarly, some of the data sources included events based on group 




groups like the Taliban, for groups to claim an attack when they did not perpetrate it, 
presumably as a propaganda tactic (Foxley, 2007).  While the EID aims to mitigate this 
concern by attempting to triangulate group claims with additional sources, it remains an 
issue.     
Given that the EID relies on open-source data, it is likely that the cases missed by 
the database are minor, non-terrorist, incidents.  As such, the latter two sets of hypotheses 
are most likely to be impacted by this form of missing data.  The dataset is likely to 
underreport the number of non-terrorist incidents, no matter whether they were 
committed by terrorist groups or non-terrorist groups.  However, beyond controlling for 
the number of available sources, there is no reason to think that the missingness of these 
minor non-terrorist incidents would have any differential impact over time.  Essentially, 
there is no reason to think more cases would be missed after the policy interventions.  
Therefore, while there will again be a degree of measurement error in the dependent 
variable, there is no plausible reason to think that it will impact results. 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
The study uses monthly time-series data in order to evaluate the effect of 
government actions on subsequent terrorist attacks and criminal activities.  The 
dependent variable is the monthly number of incidents.  For the first hypothesis, the 
dependent variable is the number of terrorist attacks in a month committed by animal-
rights and environmental terrorist groups.  For the second hypothesis, the dependent 




hypothesis, the dependent variable is the number of criminal actions performed by non-
terrorist groups.   
Independent Variables 
Assigning an exact date to certain government actions is challenging.  While the 
impact of SHAC-7 and Operation Backfire can be reasoned to have begun at a specific 
time, the actions are expected to have had an effect that extends beyond that singular 
point in time.  However, it is difficult to determine theoretically how long the effects 
should last.  Following the decision made by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), 
Operation Backfire and SHAC-7 are operationalized as occurring for a year, and then 
verified with sensitivity tests in Appendix A.  The task force that made the arrests was 
initially created in 2004, but the arrests did not start until December 7, 2005.  Therefore, 
in subsequent discussion and analysis, I will consider Operation Backfire as existing 
from December 2005 to November 2006.  Similarly, the indictment of the SHAC-7 began 
on May 26, 2004.  Therefore, this intervention will be operationalized as existing from 
June 2004 until May 2005.  Finally, President George W. Bush signed the AETA into law 
on November 27, 2006.  In accordance, it will be operationalized as starting in December 
2006.  A depiction of the trend line for each dependent variable, by year, is portrayed in 
Figure 1.  A narrower depiction of the last 10 years trend line for each dependent 
variable, with the imposed interventions, is provided in Figure 2. An advantage of these 
operationalizations is that none of the independent variables overlap, which improves the 







































































































Control Variables  
I include a dummy variable equal to 1 during the 1998-2007 CETIS GTD 
collection period and equal to 0 at all other times.6  I also control for the number of 
sources used to populate the dataset during each decade of data collection, following 
Varriale-Carson (2014).  Given the expansion of internet capabilities, there are an 
increasing number of available news sources as time progresses.  The variable equals the 
number of sources the EID used per decade: two sources in the 1970s, 10 sources in the 
1980s and 1990s, and 12 sources in the 2000s.  Another variable, crime rate, uses the 
FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) to control for the yearly national violent crime rate, 
following Varriale-Carson (2014).  A final set of three variables are used to control for 
possible effects of the surrounding political environment.  One variable, election, is 
marked as one during a November in an election year (every even year), and is marked as 
zero otherwise.  A second, lagged_election, is marked as one for the three months prior to 
the election month (i.e. August, September, and October for that year).  This variable 
would account for decisions made by animal rights and environmental groups to 
undertake greater or fewer attacks with an aim at bringing more attention to their cause.  
The third variable, Percentage Congress Republican, measures the percentage of 
representatives in all of Congress that are members of the Republican Party.  Given that 
Congressional elections occurred every two years and that there is relatively little 
                                                 
6 The GTD data for 1993 was lost when Pinkerton, the previous collector, gave the extant dataset to 
START (see LaFree and Dugan 2007 for a fuller explanation).  If the GTD were the only supplier of 
terrorist incidents, then I would have omitted the year 1993 from the analysis looking at terrorist attacks.  
However, there were five total terrorist incidents in the EID for the year 1993. Therefore, I ran an analysis 
using the deterrent model that included a dummy variable for the year 1993, to represent the GTD’s 
missingness.  The GTD’s missingness would not affect the other two models because the GTD is, by 
definition, unrelated to non-terrorism.  The GTD1993 variable was non-significant in the supplemental 
analysis, did little to affect the model’s r-squared value, and did not impact the main effects of the three 




fluctuation in party alignment between each election, the monthly percentage does not 
change in between elections.   
Methodology 
 Given that the main dependent variables are count variables, it is reasonable to 
use either a Poisson model or negative binomial model.  In deciding between the two, it is 
necessary to consider the nature of the dependent variable’s distribution.  Due to the 
potential over-dispersion of the dependent variable, it is more appropriate to use the 
negative binomial model, which is an extension of the Poisson model that keeps the same 
mean structure but frees the model’s variance to operate independently of the Poisson 
model’s mean (λ).  Essentially, the negative binomial structure adds a parameter to the 
model to better account for a larger variance.  The nature of the negative binomial model 
allows it to be estimated using a maximum likelihood function7.   
Time-series data are not collected randomly and therefore the values are typically 
dependent on previous and future values in the time-series.  As such, the model needs to 
be manipulated in several ways.  First, analyses will lag each independent variable by one 
month in order to maintain causal ordering between their implementation and the 
outcome variable.  Second, dependent variable lags are also included in each model until 
the next successive lag is not significant.  Thus, every model includes the dependent 
variable lagged by at least one period.  The dependent variable lags are important because 
their omission fails to account for correlation in the error terms.  If such correlation is 
unaddressed, the standard errors in regression analyses will be artificially deflated.  This 
increases the potential for a Type I error, where results may seem significant when they 
                                                 
7 An autoregressive Poisson model would also be well-suited to this application.  Sensitivity models in 




are, in fact, not.  Finally, each model will also include, at least, the monthly count as a 
control variable for any linear trend.  The higher orders of monthly count (squared, 
cubed, etc.) will also be tested in case the trends are nonlinear.  In the model testing for 
displacement of crime, measures of the current month squared and the current month 
cubed were included and in the model testing for diffusion of benefits, a measure of the 
current month squared was included.  These models also control for the quadratic nature 
of their trends.  Finally, Dickey-Fuller tests checking for unit roots found no evidence of 
a unit root for any of the dependent variables.   
 In total, this study uses three models to test the stated hypotheses.  Before 
designating each model’s equation, I also tested for multicollinearity.  Intuitively, 
multicollinearity would seem to be a genuine issue, as several variables are invariant over 
one or two year periods.  The variables that are least variant in this manner are the violent 
crime rate, the number of sources, and the percent of Congress that is Republican.  As 
such, I performed additional analyses removing each of these three variables one at a 
time to observe how the models’ coefficients and standard errors were affected.  In all 
cases, the omission of the variable impacted coefficients to a far larger degree than 
standard errors, which would evidence omitted variable bias.  Finally, each of the three 
variables’ utility to the model is based on theoretical merit, which further justifies their 
inclusion.  The first model tests the first hypothesis, and uses the monthly number of 
terrorist attacks as the dependent variable and can be represented as the following: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑡 = α + β1(𝐴𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑡−1) + β2(𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑡−1) + β3 (𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝐵𝐴𝑡−1) + β4(Controls) + 




where TI represents the monthly count of terrorist incidents, α is a constant, β4(Controls) 
is the vector of control variables, and β5 through βk represent the coefficient for variables 
measuring the lagged values of the dependent variable.  If β1, β2, and β3 are significant and 
negative, they will provide evidence in support of deterrence.   
The second model, which tests the second hypothesis, uses the monthly number of 
non-violent law-breaking actions by terrorist groups as the dependent variable and can be 
represented as the following: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡 = α + β1(𝐴𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑡−1) + β2(𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑡−1) + β3 (𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝐵𝐴𝑡−1) + β4(Controls) + 
β5(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇t−1)… βk(TNTIt−k)+ ε 
where TNTI represents the monthly count of non-terrorist incidents by terrorist groups, α 
is a constant, β4(Controls) is the vector of control variables, and β5 through βk represent 
the coefficient for variables measuring the lagged values of the dependent variable.  If β1, 
β2, and β3 are significant and positive, they will provide evidence in support of 
displacement of crime.   
 The third model will use the monthly number of non-terrorist attacks by non-
terrorist groups as the dependent variable and can be represented as the following:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡 = α + β1(𝐴𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑡−1) + β2(𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑡−1) + β3 (𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝐵𝐴𝑡−1) + β4(Controls) + 
β5(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇t−1)… βk(NTNTIt−k)+ ε 
where NTNTI represents the monthly count of non-terrorist incidents by non-terrorist 
groups, α is a constant, β4(Controls) is the vector of control variables, and β5 through βk 
represent the coefficient for variables measuring the lagged values of the dependent 
variable.  Like the first model, if β1, β2, and β3 are significant and negative, they will 




Chapter 6: Results and Analysis 
In total, there are 324 terrorist incidents, 395 crimes committed by terrorist 
groups, and 174 crimes committed by non-terrorist groups.  The frequency distributions 
of each dependent variable are depicted in figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Frequency distribution of count of monthly incidents, separated by dependent variable 
(continued) 
As the frequency histograms show, the data do not follow a normal distribution.  
Furthermore, the negative binomial model appears to be a reasonable choice given that 
the majority of months for each dependent variable (62% for terrorism, 53% for crime by 
terrorist groups, and 72% for crime by non-terrorist groups) had zero attacks.  Descriptive 
statistics for each variable, including all three dependent variables, are provided in table 
3.  The average number of terrorist attacks in a month was 0.88, the average number of 
non-terrorist attacks by terrorist groups was 1.07, and the average number of non-terrorist 
attacks by non-terrorist groups was 0.47.  The first analysis tested for a deterrence effect, 
using the number of terrorist events per month as the dependent variable.  For this 
regression, no order of the lagged dependent variable achieved significance (p=.48 for the 
first lag).  The results of this analysis are presented in table 48.  For the main effects of 
each variable, the incident rate ratios (IRRs) are presented alongside the regression 
results to provide a more intuitive understanding of each independent variable’s impact, 
although it does not account for the standard error.  IRRs can be calculated by  
                                                 
8 The alpha parameter estimate is significant in the model (and will be for all subsequent models), meaning 
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Table 3- Descriptive statistics for variables included in the models 




    Terrorist Events 0.88 1.89 0 16 
Other Crimes by Terrorist Groups 1.07 1.82 0 15 
Crimes by Non-Terrorist Groups 0.47 1.00 0 7 
Policy Intervention Variables 
    AETA 0.04 0.19 0 1 
SHAC 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Operation Backfire 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Controls 
    Election 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Election at 3 month lag 0.12 0.33 0 1 
UCR violent crime rate 583.13 92.47 465.50 758.20 
Percentage Congress Republican  45.40 6.14  33.83 53.46 
Congressional Power 0.91 0.86 0 2 
GTD1 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Number of Sources 9.83 2.57 2 12 
 
exponentiating each beta coefficient.  The results show that all three main policy or 
intervention variables are associated with fewer acts of terrorism in the succeeding 
month.  Of the three, Operation Backfire appears to have the strongest relationship, with 
a coefficient of -2.05.  The IRRs more intuitively quantify the results.  After the AETA, 
the rate of terrorist incidents was 0.22 the rate of terrorism before the intervention.  
Similarly, the IRRs of SHAC-7 (0.39) and Operation Backfire (0.13) demonstrate the 
stark difference in the rate of attacks after these interventions.  Taken alone, these results 
support the deterrent hypothesis (hypothesis 1), with each government action achieving 
the intended goal of decreasing domestic terrorism.  However, in order to comprehend 
the full picture, a measurement of the impact on non-terrorist actions is required.  
The second analysis tests the effect of the government actions on the monthly 





Table 4- Predictors of the monthly number of terrorist attacks, using a negative binomial regression 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) 
Policy Intervention Variables   
AETA      -1.50 (0.65)**                      0.22 
SHAC      -0.93 (0.45)**                      0.39 
Operation Backfire        -2.05 (0.59)***                      0.13 
Controls   
Election   0.04 (0.43)                      1.04 
Election at 3 month lag                    -0.36 (0.29)                      0.70 
UCR violent crime rate   0.00 (0.00)                      1.00 
% Congress Republican   0.05 (0.03)                      1.05 
GTD1     0.84 (0.50)*                      2.32 
Sources       0.26 (0.14)**                      1.29 
Current Month   0.00 (0.00)                        - 
Terrorist Events- Lag 1   0.01 (0.04)                      1.01 
Constant        -8.48 (3.19)***                        - 
Alpha         1.00 (0.20)***                        - 
***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.10 (policy intervention variables use one-tailed tests, rest use two-tailed tests) 
N=368, Pseudo R-squared=.140 
 
lags of the dependent variable put into the model were significant.  When the third lag 
was added to the model, it rendered the second lag insignificant and was insignificant 
itself.  This suggests that a one-month lag exerts the strongest effect, but, even beyond 
that, there seems to be a gradually cumulative effect of past months.  For this analysis and 
the following analysis, the GTD control variable will not be in the model because the set 
of non-terrorist incidents, by definition, should not include any incidents from the GTD.  
Table 5 presents the results for the second analysis.  The results of this analysis continue 




purview.  None of the three main policy variables was significant, failing to provide 
evidence for a displacement of terrorist group activities to non-terrorism crime.  
 The final analysis tests the effect of the government actions on the monthly count 
of crimes committed by non-terrorist groups.  Not even the first lag of the dependent 
variable was significant (p=.48).  The results of this analysis are presented in table 6. 
Table 5-Predictors of the monthly number of non-terrorist attacks by terrorist groups, using a negative 
binomial regression 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) 
Policy Intervention Variables   
AETA     0.31 (0.57) 1.36 
SHAC     0.21 (0.32) 1.23 
Operation Backfire    -0.29 (0.49) 0.75 
Controls   
Election    -0.43 (0.38) 0.65 
Election at 3 month lag                       0.09 (0.20) 1.09 
UCR violent crime rate          -0.01 (0.00)*** 0.99 
% Congress Republican     0.05 (0.03)                        1.05 
Sources       0.32 (0.17)* 1.37 
Current Month           0.09 (0.03)*** - 
Current Month-Squared          -0.00 (0.00)*** - 
Current Month-Cubed         0.00 (0.00)** - 
Terrorist Crime Lag 1           0.09 (0.03)*** 1.09 
Terrorist Crime Lag 2     0.05 (0.03) 1.05 
Terrorist Crime Lag 3     0.04 (0.03) 1.04 
Constant        -7.12 (3.59)** - 
Alpha           0.30 (0.09)*** - 
***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.10 (policy intervention variables use one-tailed tests, rest use two-tailed tests) 






Table 6-Predictors of the monthly number of non-terrorist attacks by non-terrorist groups, using a negative 
binomial regression 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) 
Policy Intervention Variables   
AETA --- --- 
SHAC                  0.59 (0.42) 1.80 
Operation Backfire                 -2.17 (1.12)** 0.11 
Controls   
Election                 -0.88 (0.66) 0.41 
Election at 3 month lag                 -0.24 (0.33) 0.79 
UCR violent crime rate                 -0.00 (0.00) 1.00 
% Congress Republican                  0.01 (0.04) 1.01 
Sources                  0.29 (0.20) 1.34 
Current Month                  0.03 (0.01)** - 
Current Month Squared                 -0.00 (0.00)* - 
Non-Terrorist Crime Lag                   0.06 (0.09) 1.06 
Constant                 -5.91 (3.81) - 
Alpha  0.73 (0.25)*** - 
***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.10 (policy intervention variables use one-tailed tests, rest use two-tailed tests) 
N=368, Pseudo R-squared=.151 
 
and highlight the importance in examining the effects of a policy that extend beyond its 
original scope.  First, there are no results provided for the AETA variable because this 
dependent variable could not empirically determine the effect of AETA.  Given that the 
AETA was operationalized as occurring in December 2006, there were only 13 months of 
data that occurred when AETA was in effect.  In this time, there were no actions by non-
terrorist groups recorded in the dataset.  Therefore, the model could not numerically 
measure AETA’s effect.  However, the finding that no incidents were recorded after 
AETA suggests that a diffusion of benefits did occur.  The coefficient for Operation 




This means that after Operation Backfire, the activities of non-violent groups 
significantly decreased.  This is a finding that supports a diffusion of benefits hypothesis, 
as stipulated by hypothesis 3b.  Finally, like the second analysis, SHAC-7 had no 
significant impact on the rate of non-terrorist actions by non-terrorist groups.  The results 
from the three analyses support the effectiveness of SHAC-7 as a purely deterrent 

















Chapter 7: Discussion 
All three key government actions had an effect that one could consider 
evidentiary support for deterrence.  Operation Backfire’s strong support is in line with 
findings from Perkoski and Chenoweth (2010) who found that discriminate deterrent 
policies, such as individual arrests, had the strongest deterrent impact.  It is important to 
note that one should interpret these results with caution, and as the estimate of an average 
impact. 
The second and third sets of results provided no support for a displacement of 
activity from terrorist actions to non-terrorist actions and mixed support for a diffusion of 
benefits.  In the second model, none of the coefficients corresponding to the implemented 
policies was significant, suggesting that terrorist groups’ non-terrorism actions did not 
increase after implementation.  In the third model, Operation Backfire elicited fewer non-
terrorist crimes by non-terrorist groups, which supports a diffusion of benefits hypothesis.  
Similarly, the implementation of the AETA provides evidence in favor of a diffusion of 
crime-control benefits.  While the law did not appear to impact non-terrorist activity by 
terrorist groups, it appears to affect non-terrorist groups, although this conclusion could 
not be verified by the regression results.  Further exploration of the impact of AETA, 
with data that extends beyond the end of 2007, would provide an empirical result to 
quantify the nature of the decline in activity that this study appears to illuminate.   
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly why terrorist groups do not simply switch tactics 
to avoid harsher penalties after laws are passed.  Aside from an incapacitation effect, 
which will be addressed shortly, the soundest explanation of these findings relies on the 




diffusion of benefits occurs when groups are unaware of whether the law applies to their 
behavior.  Displacement makes more sense when groups have a full understanding of a 
policy’s purview and adapt their behavior to avoid detection and punishment.  In the 
current context, it is difficult to argue that terrorist groups were more aware of each 
action’s scope than non-terrorist groups.  This idea is strengthened when considering that 
both terrorist and non-terrorist animal-rights and environmental groups spawn from the 
same communities.  As such, although the evidence I present in favor of a diffusion of 
benefits is drawn from non-terrorist groups, I can speculate that the scope of government 
actions was not any clearer to terrorist groups than to non-terrorist groups.  There is no 
theoretical reason to guide why terrorist groups should subsequently be any more inclined 
to increase their actions (as would evidence a displacement of crime) than non-terrorist 
groups.  While the non-terrorist groups were most vocal in their outrage and 
apprehension regarding the passing of the AETA, the same uncertainties that are cited 
above can be posited as analogous to uncertainties felt in light of Operation Backfire and 
the indictment of the SHAC-7.  
Before making strong conclusions, it is imperative to acknowledge that the dataset 
has limitations.  First, the data only includes incidents through the end of 2007, which 
limits the inferences one can make about the effect of each action after implementation.  
The third analysis could not compute a coefficient for AETA because there were literally 
no relevant incidents that occurred after the intervention.  However, I believe this 
weakness is somewhat mitigated by the use of months as the unit of analysis.  There were 
still 13 months of data after the final intervention and several more after Operation 




models.  As such, the lack of non-terrorist acts after AETA seems more likely to be a real 
drop-off rather than one resulting from too few units of analysis after the intervention.  
One should also caution against drawing any definitive conclusions from the 
findings.  While I have framed the research question to test a deterrence paradigm, the 
relationship may be more complicated and recursive than I have presented.  It is very 
plausible that the trend in terror attacks, for instance, impacted when each of the policies 
was implemented, which would then, in turn, impact levels of terrorism.  This is a 
problem of endogeneity that I cannot resolve by empirically controlling for linear and 
quadratic data trends in regression analyses.  As such, I acknowledge that the relationship 
between the policies and each of the dependent variables is not as simple as I have 
framed it in this thesis.  Another potential hesitation is that there are other plausible 
explanations for the apparent relationships found in the analyses.  For example, a 
decrease in terrorism after Operation Backfire, while supportive of a deterrence 
hypothesis, may indicate a very different reality.  The decrease in terrorism may actually 
be due to incapacitation.  Conclusions from the analysis would be limited if the main 
perpetrators of terrorism are not committing terrorism because they have no opportunity 
to do so from prison, rather than because the laws have deterred them.  Given that 
Operation Backfire specifically targeted members of the Family, incapacitation would 
only be an issue if the Family committed many events in the database before Operation 
Backfire.  However, the Family only committed two attacks in the database, casting 
doubt on incapacitation as an explanation.  Even so, the point is well taken that no 




support certain effects, no reason can be decisively given for the relationships found in 
the analyses.  
A third potential weakness is that I had to make somewhat subjective 
determinations in determining the starting and ending points of the policy intervention, 
which may have introduced error into the estimations.  It was especially difficult to 
determine what the endpoint of the SHAC-7 case and Operation Backfire were.  Further, 
as noted by Dugan (2011a), a disadvantage to a modeling decision where the unit of 
analysis is a length of time rather than a specific event is the inability to distinguish 
temporal spacing within each unit of analysis.  A month with five terrorist attacks will 
look the same as all other months with five terrorist attacks regardless of the clustering 
and spacing characterizing the attacks.  To clarify, five attacks that occur at the beginning 
of the month will appear the same as five attacks that occur in equally spaced intervals 
throughout the month.  For example, in the analyses, AETA was operationalized as 
beginning in December 2006.  Given the monthly unit of analysis, AETA could not be 
specified as beginning on any specific date.  If there were ten terrorist attacks in 
December 2006, it would be impossible to tell if all ten attacks happened right before the 
intervention, after the intervention, or both before and after the intervention.  If all ten 
attacks occurred before AETA, the policy may have had a genuine impact, but all that 
would be discernible from the data was that 10 attacks occurred in the month of AETA’s 
implementation, thus downplaying its immediate impact (see Dugan, 2011a: fig. 1 for 
clarification).  However, I did not feel this issue was detrimental in this study because 
each policy intervention could be operationalized as beginning and ending closely in time 




month in which a policy intervention was operationalized as starting in would truly 
represent the impact of the policy in that month.  
A final important shortcoming for these findings is that the results are not easily 
generalizable.  For instance, while Operation Backfire, a joint task force operation, was 
significantly related with fewer acts of terrorism and fewer criminal acts by non-terrorists 
in the animal-rights and environmental community, it does not necessarily follow that all 
joint task force operations will be effective in any scenario.  Dynamics may shift 
completely given different countries, different groups, different ideologies, or different 
types of actions.  Therefore, it is imprudent to conclude from this study that certain types 
of actions will unfailingly result in certain effects and make policy decisions accordingly.  
Furthermore, by making the choice to analyze at the group level, I implicitly assume that 
the whole group reacts in the same way.  For example, deterrence can only be interpreted 
as deterrence at a group level.  As such, while I can note that terrorist groups committed 
fewer actions after Operation Backfire, I cannot make any conclusive statements about 
the activities of specific groups, such as ALF or ELF, or the individuals composing those 
groups.  
While the results are not necessarily generalizable, they contribute to an important 
conclusion.  First, in order to progress toward a confluence of research between 
criminologists and those who study terrorism within some other discipline, it is critical to 
share terminology when endeavoring toward the same goal.  Evaluating a counter-
terrorism policy’s effectiveness post-hoc should ostensibly require the same diligence and 
critical measurement of variegated outcomes.  Many studies in criminological literature 




evaluating if a given policy was truly effective, net of its potential deterrent effect (see 
Weisburd et al 2006; Green 1995; Hamilton-Smith and Tilley 2002; Bowers and Johnson 
2003; Weisburd et al. 2004; Skinns 1998 for several examples).  Though some studies of 
terrorism policy have searched for, and found statistical evidence of, a substitution effect 
(Enders and Sandler 1993; Enders and Sandler 2004), little previous research has made 
the effort toward using such terminology to bridge the gap with criminological literature.  
The same can be said about measuring a diffusion of benefits (although see Hsu and Apel 
2015).  Furthermore, prior researchers in this area study transnational terrorism and 
displacement of targets.  To this author’s knowledge, the current study is the first that 
examined displacement and diffusion of benefits in the context of United States’ 
domestic terrorism. 
This study may also be germane to policy makers on the front end of the process.  
It is crucial that those with the power to influence interventions be fully cognizant of all 
the relevant actors to whom a potential policy stands to impact, either directly or 
residually.  The term “diffusion of benefits” can be misleading; in the current study, the 
notion that non-terrorist activists are unsure regarding whether or not their acts may be 
construed as acts of terrorism is not necessarily a positive outcome.  A fuller 
understanding before implementation, at the least, may prepare policy makers for the 
possibility of unintended consequences.   
Future expansion of these findings can foreseeably follow three lines of research.  
First, it would be useful to re-analyze past counter-terrorism policies with a new eye 
toward examining crime displacement and diffusion of benefits effects that researchers 




fuller understanding of what types of policy do and do not properly deter without having 
harmful side effects.  The second line of future exploration would further research on 
non-repressive measures of deterrence.  Dugan and Chenoweth (2012)’s study of the 
conflict between Israel and Palestine found evidence that conciliatory government 
actions, rather than punitive or repressive actions, were more likely to reduce future 
terrorist incidents.  The authors’ future research using the Government Actions in Terror 
Environments (GATE) data to evaluate effectiveness in many different countries 
promises to reconsider the best strategy to prevent terrorist attacks.  Finally, and most 
generally, this study has highlighted the need to create a stronger paradigm that unites 
concepts from criminological literature and literature on terrorism.  In addition to the 
rational choice framework used here, several more traditionally criminological theories 
have been mapped onto terrorism research (LaFree and Bersani 2014; Freilich et al. 2014; 
Agnew 2010; Black 2004).  In light of the shallow pool of research that currently exists, 




Appendix A: Sensitivity Analyses 
I have also conducted several sensitivity analyses that will test the above findings’ 
robustness.  The first uses autoregressive Poisson (ARP) as an alternative to the negative 
binomial regression to test the three models.  The results for each of the three models, 
obtained from this alternative analysis, are shown in table 7, table 8, and table 9.  The 
largest difference in modeling is that the ARP model in table 8 was an AR(4), accounting 
for the previous four terms of the dependent variable, one more than in table 5.  The 
substantive results for all three models using each method (table 4 vs. table 7, table 5 vs. 
table 8, and table 6 vs. table 9) are nearly identical, showing the robustness of results 
across model type.  
Table 7-Predictors of the monthly number of terrorist attacks, using autoregressive Poisson  
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) 
Policy Intervention Variables   
AETA         -1.48 (0.61)*** 0.23 
SHAC       -0.98 (0.42)** 0.38 
Operation Backfire         -2.29 (0.72)*** 0.10 
Controls   
Election    0.09 (0.39) 1.09 
Election at 3 month lag                     -0.39 (0.29) 0.52 
UCR violent crime rate    0.00 (0.00) 1.00 
% Congress Republican    0.05 (0.03)                        1.05 
GTD1      0.88 (0.45)* 2.41 
Sources        0.24 (0.10)** 1.27 
Current Month    0.00 (0.00) - 
Terrorism Lag 1   -0.01 (0.05) 0.99 
Constant       -11.26 (2.78)*** - 






Table 8- Predictors of the monthly number of non-terrorist attacks by terrorist groups, using autoregressive 
Poisson  
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) 
Policy Intervention Variables   
AETA    0.40 (0.47) 1.49 
SHAC    0.15 (0.27) 1.23 
Operation Backfire   -0.38 (0.44) 0.68 
Controls   
Election   -0.49 (0.38) 0.61 
Election at 3 month lag                     -0.08 (0.19) 0.92 
UCR violent crime rate         -0.01 (0.00)*** 1.00 
% Congress Republican    0.02 (0.03) 1.02 
Sources          0.51 (0.14)*** 1.67 
Current Month          0.03 (0.01)*** - 
Current Month Squared         -0.00 (0.00)*** - 
Terrorist Crime Lag 1          0.14 (0.05)*** 1.15 
Terrorist Crime Lag 2          0.13 (0.05)*** 1.14 
Terrorist Crime Lag 3        0.10 (0.05)** 1.11 
Terrorist Crime Lag 4   -0.02 (0.05) 0.98 
Constant     -5.65 (2.90)* - 





 Table 9-Predictors of the monthly number of non-terrorist attacks by non-terrorist groups, using 
autoregressive Poisson 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) 
Policy Intervention Variables   
AETA --- --- 
SHAC     0.63 (0.28) 1.88 
Operation Backfire       -2.80 (1.19)** 0.06 
Controls   
Election   -1.09 (0.69) 0.34 
Election at 3 month lag                     -0.50 (0.32) 0.61 
UCR violent crime rate    0.00 (0.00) 1.00 
% Congress Republican    0.03 (0.03)                        1.03 
Sources      0.22 (0.13)* 1.25 
Current Month        0.01 (0.00)** - 
Non-Terrorist Crime Lag     0.07 (0.05) 1.07 
Constant      -6.14 (2.54)** - 
***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.10 (Policy Intervention variables use one-tailed tests, rest use two-tailed tests) 
Monthly Data (n=368), R-squared=.192 
 
 
Following the example of Varriale-Carson (2014), I also ran analyses examining 
six-month and 18-month existence periods for each of the policies.  In these 
manipulations, the start date of the interventions remained the same; only the end dates 
were changed.  When using a six-month end date, I manipulated all three government 
interventions, while for the 18 month end date I could only manipulate the SHAC-7 and 
Operation Backfire, as there are only 13 total months after AETA.  The results for the 
second and third model were substantively the same for all end date variations, but the 
deterrent model differed slightly across all variations.  Only in the yearlong model were 
the coefficients on all three interventions significant; in the other two models, only 
Operation Backfire remained significant.  However, the yearlong model is advantageous 




First, the 18-month model has a lot of overlap in dates each dummy variable is active, 
which may vitiate the individual impact each action may have had.  Second, the six-
month model may not account for enough time for each intervention to impact results.  
While the coefficients did not decrease substantially in each model, the standard errors 
were inflated.  A six-month end date is also conceptually problematic, especially when 
the SHAC-7 intervention, although operationalized as the indictment, can be reasonably 
assumed to have lasted longer than six months.  The one-year end date therefore makes 
the most sense conceptually and empirically, as the interventions last for a long enough 
time to be properly measured, but short enough to not overlap with each other and 
potentially confound results.  However, given the results of the sensitivity analyses, it is 
clear that the results pertaining to AETA and SHAC-7 in the model measuring evidence 
of deterrence need to be considered with abundant caution. 
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